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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine and 
examine the reactions of Congressional and public 
opinion to the Truman administration's reversal of its 
demilitarization policy for Western Germany.
In September of 1950, the Truman administration 
responded to increasingly alarming Cold War 
developments by deciding to arm Western Germany as a 
bulwark against Communist expansion into Western 
Europe. Advocacy for this policy change originated in 
the Defense Department. The State Department 
subsequently adopted it as practical for the political 
purposes of the United States, and President Truman was 
ultimately convinced of its necessity by the outbreak 
of armed conflict in Korea.
Congressional opinion before the advent of the 
Korean conflict actively opposed German rearmament on 
the grounds that a remilitarized Germany might resume 
the ultranationalist activities of the Third Reich. 
After June of 1950, however, Congressional quickly 
shifted to a position of support for German rearmament.
Public opinion likewise reflected a distrust of 
Germany prior to the Korean conflict, as well as a 
strong current of opposition to German rearmament. By 
the end of 1950, however, a majority of Americans had 
switched to a position of advocacy of German 
rearmament.
Congress and the public, despite strong opposition 
to German rearmament prior to June of 1950, quickly 
fell in line behind the Truman administration's new 
policy after September. No organized protest against 
the policy ever developed. It is suggested that a 
combination of the Cold War realignment of world power 
and the immediate military crisis in Korea caused a 
perception of the new Soviet threat to outweigh 
lingering fears of Germany and therefore permitted 
Congress and the public to acquiesce to a policy of 
German rearmament.
THE POSTWAR CONVERSION TO GERMAN REARMAMENT:
A LOOK AT THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS,
AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
INTRODUCTION
The foreign policy of a democracy 
cannot be successfully carried on for very 
long unless the policy-makers continually 
consult public opinion.(1)
:---George Gallup
In the governmental system of the United States, 
foreign-policy decisions are the province of the President. 
As the chief official of the executive branch, the President 
necessarily has the ultimate say in matters of foreign 
policy and consequently assumes responsibility for the 
success or failure of policies he has authored or approved. 
Assisting the President in the making of foreign-policy 
decisions are a number of other officers representing the 
various departments built into the executive structure of 
the government. Of these officers, the Secretary of State 
traditionally assumes the most significant and visible role. 
Though the Secretary’s actual powers are only vaguely hinted 
at in the Constitution and are in practice therefore limited 
by the whims of the President in office, the Secretary of 
State and the department which he heads wield considerable 
influence upon the President and upon the nature of United
3States foreign policy. Similarly, the members of the 
Defense Department, who offer recommendations concerning 
national security based upon the current and projected 
military status of the United States, exert a powerful 
influence upon the President, particularly since the 
twentieth-century advent of the United States as a world 
power. In the end, though, the power to make decisions 
affecting the tenor of American foreign policy rests with 
the President alone.
The ability of the President to translate those 
decisions into actual, functioning foreign-policy programs 
is subject, however, to a series of specific checks which 
reside within the houses of Congress. By direct action, 
Congress can affect American foreign policy in three ways. 
First, a two-thirds vote of approval in Senate is required 
to ratify any treaties concluded by the United States with 
foreign governments. Second, Congress as a whole controls 
the fabled "purse strings” of the federal budget and by 
withholding the necessary appropriations can prevent the 
President's foreign policy-programs from being carried out. 
Third, when a foreign-policy decision requires legislation 
for its enactment, Congress can voice its support or lack 
thereof through normal legislative channels.
In addition to these direct methods of influencing the 
foreign-policy programs of the United States, Congress also 
contributes in two indirect ways to the decision-making
4process involved in the executive creation of foreign 
policy. Both houses of Congress regularly propose and adopt 
resolutions relative to current political questions which 
are subsequently directed to the executive. These 
resolutions can exert considerable pressure upon 
foreign-policy makers and, as Charles Lerche noted in his 
Foreign Policy of the American People, are "especially 
effective when they represent accurately the state of public 
opinion and when they are passed prior to the making of a 
firm commitment by the executive.11 (2) Both houses are also 
empowered to authorize investigations into all facets of the 
foreign-policy process, including both the creation and 
implementation of policies as well as the progress of 
policies already in place. The publicized results of such 
investigations can create "powerful currents of public 
opinion," and therefore have the potential to influence the 
decisions of the executive.(3) In short, then, Congress' 
role in the making of American foreign policy can be reduced 
to endorsing (or refusing to endorse) executive decisions 
through ratification, appropriation, and legislation, and to 
participation of sorts in the executive decision-making 
process by means of Congressional resolutions and 
investigations, both of which frequently invoke the specter 
of public opinion.
This specter, in turn, raises another series of 
limiting factors on the President's ability to conduct
5foreign policy: those ways in which the attitudes of the
American public can influence the executive decision-making 
process. Difficult though it is to accurately gauge 
so-called "public" opinion when, as Gabriel Almond has 
theorized, there exist in reality several publics (general, 
attentive, and elite, as well as ethnic, religious, and 
other interest groups), the prevailing attitudes among the 
mass public, or the public as a whole, unquestionably serve 
to either legitimize or condemn the foreign-policy decisions 
of the government.(4) Specifically in the arena of 
foreign-policy, the public performs three basic tasks. The
first of these is to determine the "outermost limits of 
permissible government actions." Simply put, the government 
cannot indefinitely act in a fashion which is unacceptable 
to the majority of American people. Though the government 
quite often undertakes clandestine activities, particularly 
in civil-military settings, so as to avoid the pressure of
unfavorable public opinion, major far-reaching 
foreign-policy programs cannot ultimately be kept secret and 
must therefore be resolved by means to which the public 
gives its approval, tacit or otherwise. The second task of 
public opinion is to "delineate the general direction in 
which policy should move and to isolate certain landmark 
objectives" of foreign policy. Substantial public outcry 
concerning foreign-policy issues will almost certainly 
prompt political responses designed to still that outcry,
6even when shifts in the direction of foreign policy are 
distasteful to the policy-makers in office. The final task 
performed by American public opinion regarding foreign 
policy is to debate and decide "crucial issues so important 
in themselves that the government dare not proceed until 
public sentiment has come to rest.11 (5)
In practice, then, the American foreign-policy process 
is a three-fold one: the executive branch of government
assesses the problems facing the United States within the 
foreign-policy arena and devises policies to meet those 
problems; Congress attempts to influence the executive as 
it undertakes to make policy decisions, and then exercises 
the right to "veto” policy programs requiring legislation, 
appropriations, or Senate ratification? the American 
populace, finally, reacts to policy decisions which have 
been made public and eventually voices its approval or 
disapproval, thereby indicating to the executive certain 
directions and parameters for future foreign-policy 
decisions.
In 1948, Harry S. Truman was elected President of the 
United States, and he and his new Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson spent the next four years directing the foreign 
policy of the United States through the formative years of 
the Cold War. Their policies with regard to Western Europe 
and Asia, combined with a newly militant anti-Soviet stance, 
created a political legacy which would profoundly affect
7American foreign relations for years to come. The North 
Atlantic Alliance and the attempt to create a political and 
military union among the nations of Western Europe assumed a 
particular importance for the Truman administration and were 
hailed by the New York Times in June of 1952 as the "most 
exciting and revolutionary foreign policy adventure since 
World War II."(6) Central to this adventure was the American 
decision to rearm Germany, a decision representing a 
complete reversal of the administration's previous German 
policy. The study which follows is a brief examination of 
the events leading to Truman's and Acheson's decision to 
rearm Germany, of Congressional and public reaction to that 
decision, and of the extent to which the opinions of 
Congress and the public coincided with and served to 
influence the foreign policy of the Truman administration in 
this area.
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CHAPTER I
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO REARM GERMANY
Throughout history, those who have 
tried hardest to do the right thing have 
often been persecuted, misrepresented, or 
even assassinated, but eventually what they 
stood for has come to the top and been 
adopted by the people.(1)
 Harry S. Truman
As the Second World War drew to a close in Europe in 
spring of 1945, the problem of what to do with Germany, how 
to incorporate it eventually into a reconstructed European 
community, assumed a position of primary importance on the 
agendas of Allied leaders. That the defeat of Germany would 
remove the practical underpinnings of the Soviet alliance 
with Great Britain and the United States presaged an 
inevitable political conflict of interests as to the fate of 
Germany and of Central Europe as a whole. Meanwhile, as 
Allied forces rapidly occupied German territory and exposed 
the full extent of Nazi atrocities, a global sentiment 
quickly emerged which called for the punishment of those 
responsible. In light of these developments, opinions on 
how to deal with Germany after the war proliferated in the
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United States, running the gamut of extremes from Henry 
Morgenthau's proposal to reduce Germany more or less 
permanently to an agricultural state to General Patton's 
half-cocked scheme to enlist German military aid in a 
campaign against the Soviet Union.
Thus it was that in April of 1945, when Germany's 
defeat had become imminent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 
a directive (JCS 1067) to General Eisenhower, then 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation 
in Germany, defining the immediate and long-range goals of 
military government in occupied Germany. In paragraph 4, 
article c, of JCS 1067 the "principal Allied objective" was 
defined as preventing Germany "from ever again becoming a 
threat to the peace of the world." A series of steps 
essential to the realization of this principal objective was 
then outlined and included "the elimination of Nazism and 
militarism, . the industrial disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany, . and the preparation
for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a 
democratic basis." These basic steps formed the core of the 
policy conducted by the American military government in its 
zone of occupation and subsequently in bizone and 
trizone.(2)
A second directive relative to American policy toward 
occupied Germany (JCS 1779) was issued by the Joint Chiefs 
in July of 1947, this time in a climate of deteriorating
11
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and 
Great Britain. The American commitments to denazification, 
demilitarization, and disarmament of Germany were reiterated 
and, reflecting a declaration made by Secretary of State 
Marshall before Congress in early 1947 that the economic 
revival of Germany was necessary to the restoration of the 
European economy, the directive stated as general United 
States policy that, in order to ensure a lasting peace, "an 
orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic 
contributions of a stable and productive Germany as well as 
the necessary restraints to insure that Germany is not 
allowed to revive its destructive militarism.M (3)
This latter statement of general policy toward Germany 
implied an American realization that Germany could not be 
allowed to remain a prisoner of war indefinitely. To 
American policy-makers, the economic well-being of Western 
Europe depended upon an industrially revived Germany aligned 
both politically and economically to the West. The 
increasingly alarming breakdown of four-power cooperation in 
governing occupied Germany had already prompted the United 
States, Great Britain, and France to take measures, 
independent of the Soviet Union, to insure that the Western 
occupation zones, at least, would conform to their vision of 
a "stable and productive" Germany. In January of 1947 the 
United States and Great Britain began the process of merging 
their zones of occupation, and later the same year France
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agreed to merge its zone as well with those of the British 
and Americans. Soon thereafter, at a series of meetings in 
London between February and June of 1948, the United States, 
Great Britain, and France determined to coordinate the 
economic policy of the three Western zones, to include West 
Germany in the European Recovery Program, and to write a 
democratic constitution for West Germany which would provide 
for a constituent assembly and a federal German government.
Confronted with the establishment of an economically 
revived and democratically aligned West German state, the 
Soviet Union, which had wanted to create a united but 
demilitarized Germany existing either neutrally or under 
Soviet influence, was forced to take parallel measures to 
secure its hold over the eastern zone of Germany. Thus, a 
de facto division of Germany came about which caused the 
development of a new strategic situation in Central Europe 
and, as the Cold War took shape, planted the seed which 
would grow during Truman's second administration into a new 
American policy for Western Germany: rearmament and
incorporation into a Western European defense network.
This new policy, amounting as it did to a complete 
reversal of one of the basic objectives which the United 
States had pursued in Germany since the end of the war 
(industrial demilitarization and disarmament), was arrived 
at gradually and through specific stages. It began in 1949 
in the Department of Defense as a reassessment of the
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military needs of Western Europe in the face of a powerful 
Soviet adversary; it was eventually adopted by Secretary of 
State Acheson as a practical means of simultaneously
achieving his political objectives in Western Europe as well
as providing for European defense; and finally, it was 
approved by President Truman as he faced war abroad and 
political opposition at home. Furthermore, between 1948 and 
1950, events conspired to point American policy in Germany 
toward the decision to rearm.
The Soviet blockade of Berlin was the first of these 
events and the first major post-war confrontation between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Instituted as a 
challenge to the efforts of the United States, Great Britain 
and France to unite the three Western zones economically and
politically, and as a response to the prospect of a
revitalized Western outpost well inside the Soviet 
occupation zone, the blockade closed off all overland access 
to West Berlin on 24 June 1948, using as an immediate 
pretext the announcement of currency reforms in the Western 
zones and West Berlin.(4) Truman's response was to hold firm 
by organizing a counterblockade and a round-the-clock 
airlift to supply the isolated city. A stand-off developed 
and continued for almost a year until the Soviets, unwilling 
to raise the level of force and convinced that the United 
States would not abandon its plans for a West German state, 
began to lift the blockade in April of 1949.
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Though the entire episode amounted to a diplomatic 
defeat for the Soviet Union, the blockade served to heighten 
tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviets and to 
dramatize the potential for a military conflict in Central 
Europe. Reflecting upon the blockade in his memoirs, 
President Truman concluded that it was a "move to test our 
capacity and will to resist. This and the previous attempts 
to take over Greece and Turkey were part of a Russian plan 
to probe for soft spots in the Western Allies' positions all 
around their own perimeter."(5) Thus the incident 
demonstrated to the Truman administration the efficacy of a 
firm response to Soviet advances, and it also sparked an 
anxious reappraisal among American military leaders of 
Soviet willingness to play the aggressor in Europe. The 
subsequent signing of the North Atlantic Pact on 4 April 
1949 reflected a growing concern with the military defenses 
of Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression.
The successful explosion of an atomic bomb by the 
Soviet Union in September of 1949, several years before 
Western experts had predicted the Soviets would achieve 
atomic capability, further complicated the strategic 
situation in Europe. This breaking of the American atomic 
monopoly forced American military leaders to begin to 
reevaluate the grand strategy of the United States. In a 
future war with the Soviet Union, the American military 
could no longer expect to compensate for inferior
15
conventional forces by the exclusive use of atomic weapons. 
If the Soviets assembled an arsenal of atomic bombs, 
manpower would once again become "queen of the battle," and 
in manpower, particularly in the European theater, the 
Soviet Union enjoyed a decided advantage over the Western 
Allies.
Recognizing the gravity of the situation, President 
Truman authorized the development of a hydrogen bomb, hoping 
to regain for the United States the technological lead in 
strategic weaponry. American military leaders, however, 
began to lobby for increasing conventional military presence 
in areas of strategic importance, including the rearming of 
Germany to provide for the defense of Western Europe.(6)
Simultaneously with this reappraisal of American 
defense requirements, a similar reappraisal of Cold War 
foreign policy occupied the members of the National Security 
Council who, in early 1950, began to draft a highly secret 
blueprint of American geo-political objectives. This 
document, which was masterminded by Secretary of State 
Acheson and which came to be known as NSC-68, emphasized the 
new polarization of world power between the United States 
and the Soviet Union and the fundamental ideological 
antagonism between the political systems of the two states. 
It further warned that the Soviet Union fully intended to 
impose its absolute authority upon those geographical areas 
"now under [its] control," and ultimately upon the entire
16
"Eurasian land mass."(7) To prevent this catastrophe from 
occurring, NSC-68 asserted, the United States was to assume 
the task of imposing "order" upon those areas not already 
under Soviet control so as to provide a political and 
economic environment within which free societies could grow 
and flourish. To that end, NSC-68 presented an outline of 
specific policy recommendations for the United States, one 
of which was to rapidly increase American and Western 
conventional military forces as a deterrent against Soviet 
aggression and as a means of realizing American political 
around the globe.
There were critics of NSC-68 within the State 
Department, notably George F. Kennan and Charles Bohlen, 
each of whom disagreed with Acheson's analysis of Soviet 
policy as "nothing more than an absolute determination to 
spread the Communist system throughout the world." Kennan 
and Bohlen took a more realistic approach to understanding 
Soviet foreign policy by assuming that the Soviet Union was 
acting as a national state whose primary interest was to 
protect itself and its satellites, whereas the "extension of 
Communism to other areas [was] a theoretical and secondary 
goal."(8) Acheson, however, rejected this line of thought, 
and Kennan's departure for Princeton in early 1950 
effectively neutralized his influence in the State 
Department. And Bohlen, who was in France at the time 
NSC-68 was drawn up, did not read it until 1951, well after
17
the issue was decided in Acheson's favor.
In April of 1950, NSC-68 was presented to President 
Truman who concurred wholeheartedly with the world-view 
offered in the report and agreed with the conclusion that 
the Western Allies must indeed increase their armed forces 
to meet the Russian danger.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 
1950 convincingly demonstrated to the Truman administration 
the veracity of the assumptions underlying NSC-68 and 
provided ample opportunity for the implementation of new 
policies consistent with the secret Cold War blueprint. And 
though the immediate military conflict had occurred in Asia, 
it inevitably drew American attention once again to Europe 
and to the heart of American foreign policy. From a 
military standpoint, the situation in Germany in 1950 was 
roughly analogous to that in Korea. Both states were 
divided politically and constituted potential flash-points 
along the perimeter of the Soviet Union. The stakes in 
Europe, however, were much higher that those in Korea, and 
at the time of the North Korean invasion the defenses of the 
Western Allies were less than ideal. A Soviet-supplied 
police force numbering 60,000 men had been raised in East 
Germany and was supported by twenty-seven Soviet divisions 
in the Democratic Republic. Seventy-five more Soviet 
divisions were readily available for deployment in the 
Central European theater. Against this force, the Western
18
Allies in NATO "could muster only twelve divisions, 
ill-equipped, uncoordinated, and deployed with no thought of 
combat."(9) Clearly Western Europe in 1950 was unprepared to 
defend itself against a Soviet Union determined to impose 
its will upon the entire Eurasian land mass.
By late 1950, then, as the United States found itself 
locked into a global political struggle with an enemy 
perceived to be fanatically determined, an enemy whose 
aggressiveness had been demonstrated by the Berlin Blockade 
and by the Korean conflict, an enemy with formidable 
conventional forces and a newly acquired atomic capability, 
the global political environment had shifted to the point 
that the Truman administration was willing to embark upon a 
radical new course in American foreign policy. And integral 
to that new course was the decision to rearm West Germany 
scarcely five years after Germany, under the Nazis, had been 
forced to halt its own bid for European domination.
As previously noted, this movement to rearm Germany 
began with the strategic musings of the Department of 
Defense. Reflecting on the European situation in early 
1950, Dean Acheson stated that "for some years the Defense 
Department had held that Europe could not be defended 
without the willing and active participation of Western 
Germany."(10) Though the State Department and the President 
held steadfastly to the principle of German
demilitarization, Defense Department officials continued to
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stress the need, from a purely military standpoint, of 
rearming Germany. By late 1949, following the Berlin 
Blockade and the successful Soviet atomic explosion, 
military leaders began to advocate publicly the use of 
German troops for Western defense. On 21 November 1949, 
General Lucius D. Clay, the former Chief of United States 
Forces in Occupied Germany, proposed the creation of a 
composite European military force, including German units, 
as "a means of building a unified Europe free from fear of 
Russian aggression."(11) General Clay stressed that, though 
the composite force should be strong enough to contain 
Soviet advances, no one of the participating nations should 
be capable of waging aggressive war on its own. Several 
days later, on 9 December, the weekly U.S. News and World 
Report published an article entitled "German Army? Generals 
Say Yes," in which a group of unidentified Western generals 
gave a "hard-headed military appraisal of what is going on 
as military men express it in their own language."(12) In no 
uncertain terms, this article warned of the determination of 
the Soviet Union to gain control of Germany, discounted the 
effectiveness of the atom bomb as a defensive weapon, and 
insisted that the next war would be decided, as always, by 
land armies. Warning that "time is growing short for 
Western armies to catch up," the article ended with a 
recommendation for the construction of a German army as a 
necessary ingredient in the defense of Western Europe.
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The public arguments of these "hard-headed” generals 
echoed the private sentiments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
who began, through the National Security Council, to put 
pressure on President Truman to consider the possibility of 
arming Germany. National Security Council memorandum number 
71 reported that the Joint Chiefs, as of 2 May 1950, were of 
the opinion that ”the appropriate and early rearming of 
Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of 
Western Europe against the USSR.”(13) This statement was 
followed up on 17 May by a recommendation that 5,000 federal 
police be created in Western Germany as an "initial step in 
the eventual rearming" of Germany.(14) John J. McCloy, then 
American Commissioner in Germany, also advocated the 
formation of a West German federal police force to counter 
the Soviet-supported East German build-up of a para-military 
police force which had begun in late 1949.(15) By early 
1950, then, the Department of Defense was fully committed to 
the rearming of Germany, and, from a military point of view, 
the sooner the better.
State Department officials, however, were much more 
reluctant than their Defense Department counterparts to 
embrace a policy of German remilitarization. Wary of the 
political repercussions of arming West Germany, the State 
Department repeatedly pledged American commitment to the 
policy of disarmament throughout 1949 and the first half of
i
1950. Of primary importance was minimizing the potential
21
for creating strife among the Western Allies over the 
question of German participation in Western defense.
France, in particular, was extremely hostile to the notion 
of a remilitarized Germany. Also worrisome were the 
possibility of provoking military countermeasures by the 
Soviet Union and the increasing likelihood that the two 
zones of Germany, if armed one against the other, would 
never in future be reunited. With these possibilities in 
mind, Secretary of State Acheson told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in April of 1949 that "the disarmament 
and demilitarization of Germany must be complete and 
absolute," and that "a discussion of including West Germany 
in the [North Atlantic] pact" was impossible.(16) One year 
later, in April of 1950, Acheson publicly reiterated the 
"firm adherence" of the United States to the continued 
disarmament of Germany.(17)
Within the secret confines of the National Security 
Council, however, a new mindset conducive to the rearming of 
Western Germany began to emerge in early 1950. NSC-68,
Acheson's blueprint for conducting the Cold War, was drafted 
and submitted to the President in April, and in the context 
of NSC-68 the rearming of Germany as advocated by the 
Defense Department seemed a logical step toward the creation 
of sufficient force-in-being to deter Soviet aggression in 
Europe. But through June and July of 1950, Acheson remained 
unwilling to offer the State Department's recommendation for
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such a step. On 5 June, during a statement before Congress 
requesting Mutual Defense Assistance funds, Acheson declared 
"that the United States would continue the policy of German 
demilitarization."(18) And in an addendum to NSC-71, the 
State Department refused to "advocate or press for action" 
in the question of German rearmament.(19)
Ultimately, it was the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea which provided the catalyst necessary to force 
Acheson's hand on the matter of Germany. In Present at the 
Creation, Acheson attests that his "conversion to German 
participation in European defense was quick. The idea that 
Germany's place in the defense of Europe would be worked out 
by a process of evolution was outmoded. Korea had speeded 
up evolution."(20) Several weeks after the invasion, when it 
had become apparent that the conflict would protract into a 
sustained commitment, Acheson became confident in the 
opportunity that Korea provided for implementing the 
political programs outlined in NSC-68. On 31 July 1950, 
Acheson proposed to President Truman that a European or 
North Atlantic army be created and that German troops be 
enlisted within it.(21) The President reluctantly approved 
this line of thought and set the State and Defense 
Departments to work negotiating a plan for German rearmament 
which would be acceptable to the United States' European 
allies.
By 5 September, the State and Defense Departments had
23
agreed upon a program which subsequently became known as the 
"package deal." This program called for the creation of ten 
German divisions to shore up the Western defense. Bound to 
this rearming of Germany, and conditional upon it, were 
three other elements designed to gain Allied cooperation, 
all of which were to be presented to the North Atlantic 
Council as part of a single package: American
reinforcements in the form of four to six divisions were to 
be deployed in Europe as a peace-keeping force? a Supreme 
Allied Commander was to be appointed to coordinate Western 
defense and to ensure that the German troops remained in a 
subordinate position; and American financial aid to Europe 
was to be increased. Acheson considered these elements to 
provide enough incentive and sufficient reassurance against 
possible German aggression to persuade the NATO countries to 
agree to German rearmament. Several days before the 
September meetings of the North Atlantic Council in New 
York, the package deal was forwarded jointly by the 
Departments of State and Defense to President Truman for 
official approval.
Truman, like Acheson, had long been wary of considering 
the possibility of German rearmament. The President feared 
both the political consequences of such an act and, like the 
French, the possibility that a rearmed Germany might once 
again become a threat to world peace. For these reasons, he 
favored the continuation of German disarmament as he began
24
his second administration and was moved on occasion to 
repudiate in "vehement terms” rumors that the United States 
was planning to allow West Germany to build up an army.(22)
Nevertheless, the escalation of the Cold War weighed 
heavily upon him and he reacted to Soviet moves such as the 
Berlin Blockade and the explosion of an atomic device in 
decisive fashion by mounting an airlift, approving the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and authorizing the development of the 
hydrogen bomb. The idea of German rearmament remained 
distasteful to him, however, despite the strategic 
recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As late as 16 
June 1950, Truman warned in a memorandum to Acheson against 
allowing Germany to create a police force which could become 
the basis for a future German war machine.(2 3) But the 
invasion of South Korea on 25 June apparently convinced 
Truman of the necessity of reorganizing the defense of 
Western Europe. On 31 July, Truman accepted Acheson's North 
Atlantic Army idea, and on 9 September he gave his approval 
to the package deal proposal.
In his memoirs, Truman commented upon the simple logic 
behind the inclusion of Germany in Western defense saying 
that "without Germany, the defense of Europe was a 
rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With 
Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough 
to offer effective resistance to aggression from the 
East."(24) By September of 1950, therefore, Truman had made
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the decision to rearm Germany. He authorized Acheson to 
present the package deal at the North Atlantic Council 
meetings in New York a few days later, and the new American 
commitment to German rearmament became a matter of public 
record. Though France predictably balked at the idea, every 
other NATO country agreed to German rearmament in principle, 
and the United States continued to adhere to the policy of 
rearmament throughout the remainded of Truman*s 
administration, supporting the ill-fated European Defense 
Community as well as ultimate German inclusion in NATO.
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CHAPTER II
CONGRESS AND GERMAN REARMAMENT
[A United States Senator] is an 
honest man, he is an intense fellow, he gets 
all worked up, the blood rushes to his head, 
he takes on kind of a wild, stary look at 
you, and I just do not think his mind works 
in a normal way when he gets excited.(1)
 Dean Acheson
Even as the executive branch slowly proceeded during 
1949 and the first half of 1950 toward the decision to rearm 
Germany, an open-ended debate concerning the future status 
of Germany picked up steam in the houses of Congress.
During the 1948 elections, both the Democrats and the
Republicans had included in their platforms foreign policy 
planks condemning Communism, and Congressmen of both parties 
generally agreed on the reality of the Soviet threat to 
Western Europe. And in that context, the Berlin crisis had 
focused national attention upon the precarious position of
Germany as a player in the Cold War in Europe. Though never
officially consulted, Congress had given strong support to 
Truman*s handling of the situation, and, by the end of 1949, 
Congressmen were aware of the inclinations of American
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military leaders to include German forces as part of the 
defense network of Western Europe. They also understood 
that Allied occupation of Germany could not continue 
indefinitely. Thus, they addressed the "German problem" 
periodically on the floors of the House and Senate and 
within the meeting-rooms of those committees slanted toward 
foreign policy. And, gradually, two opposing camps began to 
emerge within Congress, divided over the issue of German 
rearmament. To arm or not to arm, that was the question, as 
each side presented its case.
At the heart of the matter for those who voiced 
opposition to German rearmament was the fear that the German 
people, despite their defeat in 1945 and subsequent Allied 
efforts to denazify them, still harbored a dangerous feeling 
of ultra-nationalism and a disregard for Western democracy. 
If the Germans were permitted to arm themselves again, the 
argument went, they would undoubtedly resume the aggressive 
ways of the Third Reich and provoke yet another European or 
world war. This perceived possibility of a resurgence of 
German fascism provided a persuasive and popular case 
against rearming Germany in the houses of Congress during 
the first months of Truman's second administration.
In the House of Representatives, concern about German 
nationalism and resurgent fascism was expressed periodically 
during 1949, prompted in part by rumors that the military 
was considering German rearmament and in part by the
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imminent creation of the Federal Republic. In January, 
Representative George Sadowski (D, Michigan) introduced into 
the Congressional Record an article entitled "German Giant 
Revived," which emphasized that rebuilding a strong Germany 
in order to "take her off the American taxpayer's back" 
would result in a "restored Germany again ready for war."(2) 
Chet Holifield (D, California) echoed this sentiment in 
April when, voicing his alarm over the failure of American 
military leaders to "protect the democratic principles in 
the rehabilitation of Germany" and lamenting a similar 
failure among State Department officials, he quoted from the 
pamphlet "Prevent World War III" for the Record: "[The
Germans] have a long way to go to prove that they are 
trustworthy in economics and politics. So far they have 
merely confirmed our fears that they remain unrepentant 
supernationalists who are waiting for 'der tag' [sic]."(3)
In 1950, more members of the House of Representatives 
placed their remarks in the Record opposing German 
rearmament on the ground that Germany had not yet earned the 
trust of the Western democracies by renouncing its 
aggressive brand of nationalism. Among the more outspoken 
were such men as Abraham Multer (D, New York), Jacob Javits 
(R, New York), William Granahan (D, Pennsylvania), and 
Herman Eberharter (D, Pennsylvania). This whole line of 
thought was perhaps best summed up by Representative 
Granahan who urged in an address delivered at Mann School in
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Philadelphia on 20 April 1950 that "we must all have a hand 
in the great crusade to stem the tide of extreme nationalism 
and the remilitarization of an enemy nation that twice in 
our lifetime has attempted to enslave the world. We cannot 
afford to give Germans weapons because they will be turned 
on us." (4)
In the Senate, those who opposed rearmament also 
invoked the specter of German nationalism. Senator Guy M. 
Gillette (D, Iowa), worried by reports that denazification 
and democratization efforts in Western Germany were being 
undermined by a willingness of occupation officials to 
cooperate with former Nazis in political, industrial and 
educational arenas, declared in a radio interview in June of 
1949 that "We simply must know what is going on in Germany, 
whether or not the German mind remains the repository for 
the Hitler doctrine. Left to fester and ferment, this 
poison will spread, and in 5 years, or 10, . we will
be confronted with Nazi fascism again."(5) Senator Estes 
Kefauver (D, Tennessee) reiterated this point of view in 
October of 1949 and warned that the Germans had not yet 
earned the trust of the Western Allies, as did Senator 
Robert Hendrickson (R, New Jersey) who decried the coddling 
of former Nazis by the occupation hierarchy and publicly 
opposed the military's "fantastic plans for restoring German 
military might" in a speech to the Jewish War Veterans of 
the United States on 17 June 1950. (6)
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In addition to the danger of resurgent fascism in 
Germany, some Congressmen opposed German rearmament in 1949 
and 1950 because they feared the possibility that a 
remilitarized Germany might enter into an opportunistic 
alliance with the Soviet Union. Lumping Stalin's Russia and 
Hitler's Germany together in the catch-all category of 
totalitarian states and recalling the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
men such as Representatives Jacob Javits and Arthur Klein 
(D, New York) and Senator Guy Gillette worried that a 
rearmed Germany, instead of acting as a bulwark against 
Communism, would cast its lot with the Soviets against the 
Western democracies. On 8 August 1949, on the floor of the 
House, Javits declared that "Russian manpower and 
fanatacism, joined with German technical resources and skill 
in military organization could be the solution— sought by 
totalitarians of the left and right alike— as to how 
American might could be broken."(7) Senator Gillette 
concurred, and in February of 1950 singled out what he felt 
to be the greatest danger then facing the United States in 
the European theater: "the danger that a rebuilt, rearmed
super-nationalist Germany will unite in totalitarian 
brotherhood with the Soviet Union in a third attempt in this 
century to conquer the world."(8)
Alarmed, then, by the support of American military 
leaders for German rearmament and fearful that the 
occupation had not succeeded in eliminating German
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nationalism and adherence to Nazi doctrines, those 
congressmen who opposed rearming took such action as they 
could to assess the true situation in Germany and to 
discourage remilitarization. On 7 June 1949, Senators Guy 
Gillette, Robert Hendrickson, Irving Ives (R, New York), and 
Claude Pepper (D, Florida) introduced a resolution (Senate 
Resolution 125) which authorized the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to conduct an investigation of "all 
matters relating to the conduct and status of the 
denazification program” in the American occupation zone.(9) 
Among those questions considered especially important were 
whether or not there was a resurgence of intensive militant 
nationalism, whether or not there was a rise of strong 
neo-Nazi political parties, and whether or not former Nazis 
had been eliminated from influential positions in public 
office and industrial organizations. Rearmament of Germany, 
despite the strategic situation in Europe, was unthinkable, 
the Senators argued, until these issues had been effectively 
addressed. A similarly-worded resolution (House Resolution 
489) was submitted in February of 1950 in the House of 
Representatives by Emanuel Celler (D, New York).(10)
In addition to these resolutions, members of 
Congressional fact-finding missions in Europe used their 
highly public profiles to express opposition to German 
rearmament. On 26 November 1949, five of six members of the 
Senatorial Appropriations Subcommittee, having just
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completed a five-week investigation of economic and military 
integration in Western Europe, declared in London that they 
would "oppose any proposal to rearm the West German state 
until the latter was economically stable and democratic 1 in 
the Western sense of the word.'"(11) A House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee returned a similar verdict in December of 1949 
following a mission of inquiry in Europe. The group 
unanimously condemned German rearmament because, member 
Jacob Javits reported, the Germans still harbored strong 
feelings of "ultranationalism."(12)
On the other side of the coin, however, was a somewhat 
smaller group of Congressmen who voiced their support for 
German rearmament. Though wary of German nationalism, this 
group subscribed to the Defense Department's view of the 
strategic situation in Europe. Like the Joint Chiefs, these 
Congressmen considered a strong Germany necessary to the 
European balance of power, both economically and 
politically, and regarded the use of German manpower, 
military prowess, and territory as necessary for a 
defense-in-depth against Communist aggression from the East. 
Some supporters of German rearmament qualified their support 
by proposing that strict controls be placed upon any German 
units raised, while others favored giving Germany a 
relatively free hand; but all agreed on the principle of 
German rearament.
In the House, William Lemke (R, North Dakota) was one
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of a very few Representatives to go on record in 1949 as 
supporting German rearmament.(13) Though one of a handful of 
old progressives still in office, and as such critical of 
the Truman administration's extreme anti-Communist stance 
and its subsequent (and expensive) emphasis on national 
security, Lemke argued that Western Europe could not 
function while Germany remained an economic and political 
vacuum and he advocated the creation of a German army
complete with its own general staff.(14) In the Senate,
Walter George (D, Georgia), Elmer Thomas (D, Oklahoma), and
George Malone (R, Nevada) each declared, in varying degrees,
their support of a rearmed Germany. Senator George, second 
in seniority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said 
in September of 1949 that, in light of the danger to Western 
Europe from the Soviet Union, it was "very shortsighted to 
continue to tear down the arms factories in Germany."
Germany ought to be permitted to arm itself against 
aggression from the East, he argued, and concluded that "the 
Germans alone can give military security to Western 
Europe."(15) Senator Thomas, a member of the Senatorial 
Appropriations Committee, also considered Germany the key to 
Western defense and proposed that "several divisions of 
German troops should be armed by the United States without 
Germany being herself permitted to manufacture arms."(16)
And on 2 6 November 1949, Thomas was the only of six Senators 
to speak in favor ot German rearmament following an
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Appropriations Subcommittee investigation of economic and 
military integration in Western Europe.(17) Senator Malone, 
finally, proposed a remilitarized and industrialized Germany 
established as part of a European family of nations, a sort 
of United States of Europe, which would reap economic and 
defensive benefits while imposing checks upon aggression 
from within.(18)
Thus, by early 1950, two camps had developed in 
Congress, divided not along party lines but over the 
question of whether the United States ought to rearm 
Germany. Of the two viewpoints, to arm or not to arm, the 
latter was clearly the more pevasive given the 
all-too-recent memories of Nazi Germany and following as it 
did the official American policy at that time. But the 
outbreak of armed conflict in Korea in June of 1950 prompted 
a reevaluation of the armament question in the houses of 
Congress, just as it had in the executive branch of the 
government, and in light of this development the tide of 
Congressional opinion quickly changed.
In the collective thinking of Congress, the Korean 
conflict had, as Acheson put it, speeded up evolution 
concerning attitudes toward ultimate position within the 
Western European community. The Cold War had suddenly 
become a hot one, in the Asian theater at least, and a 
natural hardening of anti-Communist sentiment accompanied 
news of the invasion. The Defense Department's lobby for
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German rearmament picked up steam and the New York Times 
reported on 27 June 1950 that "the campaign [in Washington] 
to rearm the West Germans and Japanese [had] increased over 
the weekend.”(19) As the Korean conflict protracted into an 
extended military involvement incorporating the use of 
American troops and prompting military appropriations which 
put the United States on a wartime footing once again, 
members of Congress began to look at the situation in Europe 
from a more purely defensive standpoint, and what they saw 
there led most of them during the next two years to cast 
their lots with the executive. Quite simply, following the 
North Korean invasion, the military threat from the Soviet 
Union eclipsed the potential threat of resurgent Nazism in 
Germany, and the question that now faced Congress was no 
longer to arm or not to arm but how to arm and to what 
extent.
To be sure, there were still those in Congress who felt 
that the Germans' penchant for fascism was such that it 
precluded German military participation in Western defense, 
desirable as that may have been in the face of Soviet 
military might. Jacob Javits, notably, continued throughout 
the remainder of Truman's administration to oppose German 
rearmament in any capacity. Soon after the beginning of the 
Korean conflict, Javits personally visited President Truman 
and appealed to him to prevent the remilitarization of 
Germany, and as late as February of 1952 Javits declared
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that "we are in danger of forgetting too soon the brutal 
aggression and unparalelled [sic] destruction of the moral 
code of civilization in World Wars I and II loosed by 
Wilhelm*s Germany and Hitler’s Reich."(20) Several other 
members of Congress also periodically sounded the warning 
that fascism was not dead in Germany, including 
Representative Arthur Klein and Senators Wayne L. Morse (D, 
Oregon) and James Murray (D, Montana), but the number of 
nay-sayers dwindled as the "fearful and fearsome year of 
1951" progressed.(21)
A handful of other Congressmen, such as Representatives 
Toby Morris (D, Oklahoma) and Lawrence H. Smith (R, 
Wisconsin), voiced objections to German rearmament in 1951, 
not because of fear of resurgent fascism or because they 
objected to rearmament in principle, but because several 
polls conducted in Western Germany indicated that a majority 
of the German people themselves opposed the militarization 
of the Federal Republic.(22) Morris and Smith were afraid it 
would be extremely difficult to accomplish a policy of 
rearmament given such negative public opinion in Germany.
But the real debate in Congress over German rearmament 
after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea concerned not the 
principle of rearmament itself, which by September was a 
foregone conclusion, but the nature of that rearmament. On 
one side of this new debate stood those Congressmen who 
reluctantly accepted the inevitability of a rearmed Western
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Germany, but who also insisted upon instituting controls, 
more or less rigid, upon whatever German military forces 
might be raised so as to prevent them from acting in an 
independent manner. On the other side stood those 
Congressmen who advocated giving Germany a relatively free 
hand.
In August of 1950, while addressing the issue of 
American commitments to Western European defense on the 
floor of the House, Representative William Poage (D, Texas) 
proposed as a solution to the manpower problem that 
twenty-five divisions of German nationals, including 
veterans of the Wehrmacht, be recruited and deployed. "Let 
their company officers be Germans," he suggested, "but make 
their field officers Americans. Equip them with American 
machines. Give them but a few days1 supply of ammunition. 
Keep the ammunition reserves in France or even in England, 
as assurance that they will never turn on our friends."(23) 
This proposal reflected the basic tenor of the support for 
German rearmament qualified by specific controls which would 
emerge in Congress over the next two years. The Congressmen 
who subscribed to this viewpoint gradually created a general 
framework of sorts within which they would accept rearming 
Western Germany. This framework was characterized by 
integration of German troops into a European or North 
Atlantic army under the leadership of Allied commanders 
(essentially the same plan that the North Atlantic Council
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was then considering), by strict regulations on the kinds of 
arms the Germans would be allowed to carry and manufacture 
(certainly not the "most modern” weapons), and by a 
simultaneous internal suppression of neo-nazism within the 
Federal Republic. These three conditions, it was argued, 
would allow the creation of a ground force sufficient to 
repel a Communist push into West Germany while providing 
adequate insurance against the newly-recruited German 
soldiers1 becoming the war machine of a Fourth Reich.
Qualified support of German rearmament proved to be a 
popular position in Congress, especially after Acheson 
announced in September of 1950 that the United States had 
officially committed itself to rearming. A good number of 
Congressmen voiced their approval of a program of 
conditional rearmament, among them Senate Majority Leader 
Scott Lucas (D, Illinois) and Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Thomas Connally (D, Texas).(24) But 
there also emerged a smaller and more radical group of 
rearmament advocates who argued that by keeping Germany in a 
subordinate military position relative to themselves, the 
Western Allies would undermine rather than secure the 
integrity of Western defense efforts. Unless the United 
States made peace with Germany and allowed it to enter into 
the Western European partnership as a sovereign and equal 
state, this group maintained, "the continuance of Germany in 
a second-rate position [would] rankle in the bosoms of
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German leaders of all parties, and the minority which today 
cries out that Germany is being frustrated could some day 
become a majority."(25) Treating Germany indefinitely as a 
conquered nation, in other words, would create an 
environment conducive to the rise of another Hitler. For 
this reason Representative Usher Burdick (R, North Dakota) 
urged on the floor of the House in September of 1950 that 
the United States sign a peace treaty with Western Germany 
and permit that country to arm itself.(26) Germany, he 
declared, could not remain "virtually a prisoner of war" any 
longer.(27) This viewpoint and all that it implied, 
including an independent German military force with its own 
general staff, was echoed periodically in the House and 
Senate during 1951 and 1952.(28)
But whether or not the rearmament of Western Germany 
was to be carried out under close Allied supervision or by 
the Federal Republic in an independent fashion, a consensus 
that rearmament of some sort was both necessary and 
inevitable spread through both houses of Congress in the 
months after the Korean conflict began. And that consensus 
was reflected in the actions undertaken by Congress in 1951 
and 1952.
On 4 April 1951, the Senate passed a resolution (Senate 
Resolution 99) proposed by Tom Connally and Richard Russell 
(D, Georgia) and amended by Joseph McCarthy (R, Wisconsin) 
and Irving Ives (R, New York), which approved the actions of
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President Truman (including the sending of four American 
divisions to Europe) in cooperating in the common defense 
efforts of the NATO nations. The amendment to the 
resolution read as follows:
It is the sense of the Senate that 
consideration should be given to the 
revision of the plans for the defense of 
Europe as soon as possible so as to provide 
for the utilization on a voluntary basis of 
the military and other resources of Western 
Germany and Spain, but not exclusive of the 
military and other resources of other 
nations.(29)
The resolution, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of 
69 to 21 with 6 not voting, and represented a concrete step 
toward Senatorial approval of the European Army then being 
discussed by Acheson and the North Atlantic Council.(30)
Several months later, Representative William Miller (R, 
New York) introduced a resolution requesting the negotiation 
of a peace treaty with the Federal Republic and the 
admission of Western Germany as a member of the Atlantic 
Pact agreement.(31) This proposal was quickly followed by a 
joint resolution passed by the House and the Senate to 
terminate the state of war between the United States and the 
government of Western Germany.(32) President Truman 
subsequently approved this resolution and it went into 
effect on 3 November 1951 as Public Law 181.
Meanwhile, as 1952 approached, Secretary of State 
Acheson was busily negotiating with the foreign ministers of 
the Western European powers on the subject of German
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rearmament. After lengthy discussions, the Western Allies 
finally agreed upon a plan for a European Defense Community 
to be comprised of France, Western Germany and the Benelux 
countries, and which could cooperate militarily with the 
North Atlantic Alliance. Within the context of the EDC, 
which provided for specific controls on the nature of German 
military participation, Germany would be allowed to raise 
500,000 men in twelve divisions. The EDC Treaty was signed 
in Paris on 27 May 1952 and though it did not require the 
approval of the United States Senate, both a protocol and a 
convention which were adjuncts to it and to the North 
Atlantic Treaty and which directly involved the NATO 
countries did require Senatorial ratification.
On 1 July 1952, then, the Senate convened to discuss 
and vote upon two orders of business concerning the future 
status of West Germany. The first, a Convention on 
Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, constituted, in effect, a peace treaty with West 
Germany. The Senate debated the Convention and approved it 
by a vote of 77 to 5 with 14 not voting.(33) The second 
order of business, a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
on Guaranties Given by the Parties to North Atlantic Treaty 
to the Members of the European Defense Community, 
effectively admitted the members of the EDC into the North 
Atlantic Alliance. West Germany, significantly, was the 
only EDC member that was not already a member of NATO, so
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the Protocol was contrived to bring the Federal Republic 
into the Western military alliance. After some discussion, 
the Senate consented to ratification of the Protocol by a 
vote of 72 to 5 with 19 not voting.(34) In so doing, the 
Senate, with very little internal dissent, voiced its 
approval of the Truman administrations's German policy, 
specifically that concerning rearmament, by means of direct 
action. Senator Tom Connally, during the discussion of the 
Convention, succinctly stated the reasons governing this 
Senatorial endorsement and identified the consensus at which 
the Senate (and Congress as a whole) had arrived by July of 
1952: "It is obviously in our best interest that Western
Germany be defended, not only because the free world cannot 
afford to lose its manpower and industrial capacity but also 
because it pushes the boundary of freedom just that much 
farther east."(35)
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CHAPTER III
THE PUBLIC AND GERMAN REARMAMENT
A man who is influenced by the polls or 
is afraid to make decisions which may make 
him unpopular is not a man to represent the 
welfare of this country.(1)
 Harry S . Truman
We have become of a somewhat 
hypochondriac type, and ascertain our state 
of health by this mass temperature taking. 
Fortunately this was not one of the 
hardships of Valley Forge.(2)
 Dean Acheson
As the Defense Department clamored for a military 
solution to the German problem, as the Secretary of State 
wrestled with the political situation in Europe, and as 
Congress debated the wisdom of rearming a people which had 
only recently been an enemy of the United States, the 
American populace continued, as always, to occupy itself 
with the more immediate concerns of everyday life. Yet the 
public was not unaware of the issues related to Germany's 
future role in the European community or of the precarious 
position of Western Germany as a pawn in the Cold War 
confrontation between the East and the West. Indeed, 
judging from the results of George Gallup's public opinion
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polls, the American people shared many of the doubts which 
troubled government officials during Truman's second 
administration.(3)
In the first week of July of 1949, for example, just 
over a month before the first elections were held for the 
West German parliament, a sample of Americans was asked 
whether it believed that the German people were yet capable 
of governing themselves in a democratic way.(4) Of those 
polled, fifty-five percent responded negatively, reflecting 
a general concern with the progress of democratization in 
occupied Germany. When asked in September of 1949 whether 
they thought that, in the event of another world war, West 
Germany would fight against the United States, thirty-two 
percent of those polled indicated that they believed the 
Federal Republic would turn against the United States.(5)
And in May of 1950, of Americans polled who could correctly 
identify the countries then occupying Germany, fifty percent 
said that West Germany should not be permitted to rebuild an 
army as a protection against Soviet aggression.(6)
These responses demonstrated a public reaction to the 
possibility of rearming Germany similar in nature to that 
which occurred in Congress in 1949 and the first half of 
1950. In the minds of many Americans, the memory of Nazi 
Germany was still too recent, and distrust of the German 
people still too great, to allow the creation of a new 
German army even as a deterrent to military threats from the
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East.
A reluctance to endorse German rearmament, however, did 
not mean that the American populace discounted the Soviet 
Union as an adversary and threat to world peace. Results of 
surveys taken in May of 1949, soon after the lifting of the 
Berlin Blockade, indicated that the majority of Americans 
were extremely suspicious of the motives and intentions of 
the Soviet Union. When asked whether they believed the 
Russian government sincerely wanted peace, sixty percent of 
those polled responded in the negative.(7) When asked 
whether they thought the Soviet Union intended to "cooperate 
with [the United States] in world affairs," sixty-two 
percent said "no.11 (8) When asked whether they believed the 
Soviets were trying to become "the ruling power of the 
world," or "just building up protection against being 
attacked in another war," sixty-six percent responded that 
the former was indeed the case.(9) And by December of 1949 
the percentage of Americans who believed the Soviet Union 
was out to rule the world had increased to seventy 
percent.(10)
At roughly the same time, then, that Secretary of State 
Acheson began work on the highly secret document NSC-68, 
American public opinion had already arrived at the basic 
assumptions which Acheson would use to underpin his 
blueprint for Cold War foreign policy. That the majority of 
Americans did not believe the Soviet Union wanted peace or
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would cooperate politically with the United States 
paralleled Acheson*s belief that the fundamental ideological 
differences between the two states would never allow them to 
peacefully co-exist. And the belief that the Soviet Union 
was building itself up to be the ruling power of the world 
coincided directly with Acheson*s assumption that the 
Soviets fully intended to impose their absolute authority 
upon the entire Eurasian landmass.
Thus, by 1950, the majority of Americans independently 
concurred with the principles underlying what was to become 
the Truman administration's working outline for conducting 
its foreign policy. Yet the public, like Acheson and 
Truman, remained wary of the Denfense Department's 
recommendations for rearming West Germany in response to the 
perceived Soviet threat in Europe. Ultimately, it would 
take an "uncontestable" confirmation of the Soviet Union's 
intent to exert its control through military means to 
convince the American public of the necessity of rearming 
the Germans.
That confirmation came in June of 1950 with the 
beginning of the Korean conflict. Like Acheson and Truman, 
most Americans assumed that the North Korean invasion was 
Soviet-directed.(11) As a result, by November of 1950, the 
percentage of the population that believed the Soviet Union 
was setting itself up to become the world's ruling power 
jumped to eighty-one percent.(12) When questioned about
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China's entry into the fighting, moreover, eighty-one 
percent of those polled said that they thought China had 
also acted on orders from Russia, and, in February of 1951, 
seventy-nine percent of Americans polled indicated that they 
believed the Soviet Union wanted the United States to become 
entangled in a full-scale war with China "so that Russia 
[would] have a better chance of winning in Europe."(13)^
The fighting in Korea, then, served effectively to 
corroborate the public's opinion of the Soviet Union's 
political and military intentions, to harden anti-Soviet 
sentiment, and, as the conflict protracted and threatened to 
become a war of major proportions, to focus attention once 
again upon the state of Western Europe's defensive 
capabilities. The question of German rearmament 
subsequently came to be regarded in a slightly different 
light after the North Korean invasion, and, even as it had 
in Congress, the newly-realized military threat from the 
Soviet Union began to push the memories of Nazi Germany into 
the past and to overcome American reluctance to arm a former 
enemy.
By August of 1950, seventy-one percent of Americans 
polled advocated the creation of a West German armed force 
of a size equal to that then being deployed by the 
government of the German Democratic Republic.(14) In 
December, responding to a question concerning the defense of 
Western Europe, fifty—five percent of those polled indicated
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that they thought Western Germany ought to be allowed to 
build up an army capable of resisting an attack from the 
Soviet Union.(15) A further eight percent answered 
similarly, but qualified their approval of such a move by 
saying that the proposed German army ought to be under 
American or United Nations control.(16) And almost a full 
year later, in a survey conducted in September of 1951, 
fully seventy-two percent of the respondents favored the use 
of West German troops in an Allied European defense force 
under the command of General Eisenhower.(17)
Thus, American public support for a rearmed Germany 
quickly mounted following the outbreak of hostilities in 
Korea. Inasmuch as most Americans shared the Truman 
administrations perception of the Soviet Union, and because 
the Korean conflict appears to have provided a catalyst for 
re-examining the military situation in Western Europe both 
on official and public levels, it is reasonable to assume 
that a growing fear of the Soviet Union in the public mind 
eclipsed the old fear of resurgent Nazism, creating a 
climate favorable to the idea of German rearmament.
To be sure, an undercurrent of public opposition to 
German rearmament persisted even after Korea. In early 
1951, for instance, a number of organizations went on record 
as opposing German rearmament in any form, including the 
National Executive Committee of Jewish War Veterans and the 
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.(18)
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But no sustained public protest against the government's 
commitment to rearming Germany ever materialized, and the 
issue never became a source of significant public debate, 
even when Acheson dropped the "bomb at the Waldorf" in 
September of 1950.(19) The American public, therefore, lent 
its tacit support to the principle of German rearmament and 
allowed the Truman administration (as well as subsequent 
administrations) a free hand in pursuing that policy after 
the fall of 1950.
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CHAPTER IV
A BRIEF CONCLUSION
Ideally, American foreign policy ought to reflect a 
general consensus among the executive branch of government, 
Congress, and the American public as to which actions and
programs best serve the interests of the United States. In
practice, however, because the initiative and ultimate 
responsibility for foreign policy reside with the executive 
branch, foreign-policy decisions, particularly those dealing 
with national security, are often made by the President
without first consulting Congress or the whims of public
opinion. In such cases, the repercussions of an unpopular 
foreign-policy program are left to work themselves out after 
the fact.
The Truman administration^ decision to arm Western 
Germany was just such a case. By approving the package deal 
in September of 1950, Truman committed the United States to 
a policy of German rearmament only five years after the 
defeat of the Third Reich. In so doing, the President 
yielded to the wishes of the Department of Defense, which 
for some time had argued that arming Western Germany was a
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crucial element in defending Western Europe against the 
Soviet Union, and of Dean Acheson's State Department which 
advocated German arming as a concrete step toward 
realization of the larger political plan put forward in 
NSC-68. Truman himself, though reluctant to give the 
Germans arms, finally agreed to do so soon after the 
outbreak of the Korean conflict, having become convinced of 
the Soviet Union's predilection for using force (albeit 
through a North Korean proxy) in pursuing its political 
goals and of the efficacy of a tough stance (as during the 
Berlin crisis) in opposing Soviet thrusts. In the minds of 
the members of the Truman administration, then, the looming 
threat of communist expansion had eclipsed by 1950 the 
lingering fears of a fascist resurgence in Western Germany, 
and the arming of the Federal Republic had become a logical 
step in the shoring up of Western Europe.
The announcement of this new policy, which amounted to 
a complete reversal of the administration's previous staunch 
commitment to a demilitarized Germany, might well have been 
expected to provoke a strong measure of Congressional 
disapproval, as well as substantial public outcry. Indeed, 
a sizable Congressional faction opposing German rearmament 
had repeatedly prompted the Truman administration in 1949 
and the first half of 1950 to deny rumors that the United 
States intended to arm Western Germany, and American public 
opinion had likewise reflected fairly widespread suspicion
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of the new German Republic and of the wisdom of arming it. 
Yet in the months following Acheson*s dropping of the *'bomb 
at the Waldorf" in September of 1950, organized 
Congressional opposition to the new policy failed to emerge, 
despite even the vigorous efforts of liberals like Jacob 
Javits. Instead, Congress gradually moved toward a position 
of acquiescence with regard to German rearmament and soon 
lent its direct support to the policy through such measures 
as the passing of Senate Resolution 99 and Public Law 181 
and the ratification of the Convention on Relations and the 
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. Nor did any 
substantial public protest against the new U.S. commitment 
to a rearmed Germany ever develop. Quite to the contrary, 
surveys conducted in late 1950 and in 1951 indicated that a 
clear majority of Americans were now in favor of 
incorporating German troops into the Western defense 
network.
Why, then, did no real domestic opposition to German 
rearmament materialize after September of 1950? To a large 
extent, the timing of the policy decision contributed 
materially to its eventual acceptance, coming as it did 
within a rapidly progressing geo-political realignment and 
coinciding with an immediate military crisis which together 
rendered German rearmament acceptable to a Congress and an 
American public otherwise indisposed to the idea of a 
remilitarized Germany so soon after the conclusion of the
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Second World War. Just as the polarization of world power 
and the crystallization of the Cold War had become the 
primary issues facing American foreign-policy-makers in 
1950, the East-West conflict had become a fact of life and a 
matter of great concern and anxiety for the American 
populace as a whole. And the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea, precipitating a direct military response from the 
United States complete with substantial troop commitments, 
brought the ideological confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and the United States to a head. It was in this 
political and military context that Congress and the 
American public would find it both premissable and necessary 
to arm the Federal Republic of Germany.
Prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in Korea, the 
possibility that a rearmed and economically revitalized 
German state might once again become a threat to world peace 
had been sufficient to convince many Congressmen to oppose 
the viewpoint (held by the Defense Department and by a 
handful of Senators and Representatives) that a strong 
Germany was an essential component in defending Western 
Europe against the Soviet Union. Despite increasingly 
alarming Cold War developments, including the Berlin 
blockade and the Soviets' breaking of the American atomic 
monopoly, Congress apparently continued to fear the defeated 
Germans at least as much as it did the newly-powerful Soviet 
Union. The North Korean invasion of South Korea, however,
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rather forcefully propelled Congress into the postwar era 
and convinced most Congressmen that global Communist 
expansion posed a greater threat to the security of the 
United States than did the dwindling potential of resurgent 
fascism in Western Germany. As the Soviets replaced the 
Germans as the American enemy of choice, Congress was quick 
to re-evaluate its stance on the priorities involved in 
Western European defense, aligning itself thereafter with 
the policy decisions of the Truman administration.
In the arena of public opinion, too, the Korean 
conflict seems to have provided the catalyst necessary for a 
public conversion to support of German rearmament. In 1949 
and 1950, before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the 
American populace harbored a lingering distrust of the 
German people and appeared reluctant to rearm a nation so 
recently defeated as an enemy. At the same time, however, 
the public was becoming increasingly wary of the Soviet 
Union and of what it perceived (like Acheson and the NSC) as 
a Soviet intention to dominate the Eurasian landmass. The 
Korean conflict, subsequently, served to confirm the 
public's worst fears about the Soviet Union. Soon after its 
beginning, a majority of Americans began to support the idea 
of arming Western Germany as a means to prevent possible 
Soviet military advances into Western Europe. The fear of a 
real Soviet military threat had eclipsed in the minds of 
Americans the fear of a potential fascist resurgence in
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Western Germany.
The crystallization of the Cold War, then, involving 
the American adoption of a relatively extreme anti-Soviet 
mentality, combined with the sensational nature of the 
Korean conflict to create an atmosphere favorable to the 
acceptance of German rearmament by the American public and 
Congress. The announcement of the new policy in September 
of 1950 met with no substantial opposition because Congress 
and the public, swayed by the same factors which earlier 
convinced Truman of the necessity of an armed Germany, had 
already arrived at the same conclusion: in the face of the
perceived Soviet military threat to Western Europe, the 
arming of the Federal Republic of Germany was required for 
Western security. Thus, the pursual of the Cold War as 
policy by the Truman administration and the experience of 
the Cold War as reality by Congress and the public led 
inexorably to an American commitment to German rearmament 
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